




Reviewing Code for Security



John Steven

Senior Director
Advanced Technology Consulting
Cigital Inc.
jsteven@cigital.com

You Are Here



Alternative Models / Methods

Contemporary Code Review Approaches

- Peer review
- Fagan-style code review
- Tool-based automated approach



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Starting A Code Review w/ a Blank Sheet

*Threat modeling MUST guide where we look...
...and for what.*



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Background

What is a Threat Model

What is a Threat Model

- Depiction of:
 - The system's *attack surface*
 - *Threats* who can attack the system
 - *Assets* threats may compromise
- Some leverage risk management practices
 - Estimate *probability* of attack
 - Weight *impact* of successful attack



Threat Modeling – High-level process

- 1 Diagram structure
 - 1 Draw the *software* diagram
 - 2 Identify the attack surface
 - 3 Identify patterns' usage
 - 4 Identify frameworks
 - 5 Identify security controls
- 2 Show Principals, resolution
- 3 Show authorization required



Code Review Approaches (Highest Level)

Cigital's Three Approach

- Known Weakness Analysis
- Ambiguity Analysis
- Underlying Framework Analysis



Known Weakness Analysis: Checklist #1

Ask: is each element:


- Control absent?
- Used ineffectively
 - What's the effect of digesting a password?
 - Does code signing prevent malicious code?
 - What does SSL (w/o) certs provide?
- Implemented correctly?
- Present, but unused

Jeff Williams has suggested this framework for security controls for some time



Key Structural Components narrow search

Component diagrams show critical choke points for security controls (input validation, authentication, output encoding)



1 - Diagram Software Structure

1.1 - Anchor in Software Architecture

Consider where attacks occur

Top-down


- Enumerate business objects
 - Sensitive data
 - Privileged functionality

Bottom-up


- Enumerate application entities
 - Sensitive data
 - Privileged functionality

Look for

- Middleware
- Open source
- Frameworks







Avoid 'the stack'




What does this diagram tell you about component interaction?



Architecture Diagrams




1.2 – Identify Application Attack Surface



1.5 – Identify Frameworks

Showing frameworks indicates where important service contracts exist 'up' and 'down'




Identifying the Attack Surface as a Developer

- Struts1
- Struts2
- Spring?



1.3 - Annotate with design patterns



Design Patterns, isn't that a bit Hifalutin?




- I'm supposed to find exploits
- Besides, I don't have good design docs
- These guys do *not* look like security researchers

Once Patterns' Responsibilities Defined

- Find them
- Figure out how they apply
- Evaluate the responsibility (next)
- Decide what common attack patterns apply (later)



Exercise: Find responsibilities



1.4 – Consider Patterns' responsibilities

MVC Element	View		Controller		Model
Component	Client-side Script	Decorator Servlet	Controller Servlet	Action Servlet	Persistent Store
Responsibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Aspects of User experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Consuming and hiding error conditionsFiltering output in a target-specific fashion	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Authenticating requestsFiltering / validating inputLimiting user access rights to appropriate workflowsDispatching actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Processing requestsGenerating contentRedirecting sessions to different viewsCoarse-grain transaction boundary	<ul style="list-style-type: none">ACID transaction propertiesHold data

- Document specific standards for implementing each responsibility

Explicit Responsibilities Mean Better Advice

Client Side

- User Interface
- Responsive, instant
- Apply validation
 - Perhaps imperfect
 - Perhaps quickly
- Give the user *good* advice
 - Be as specific as possible
 - Help the user

Server side

- Business logic
- Decode
- Canonicalize
- Apply
 - Known-good
 - White-list
 - Black list
- Respond to attack
 - Defend self
 - Retain intelligence
 - Monitor
 - Prevent future attack



Configuration (Declaratively)

```
<bean id="UserNameValidator"  
class="org.springframework.petclinic.web.UserNameValidator" />
```

```
<bean id="AddUserForm"  
class="org.springframework.petclinic.web.AddUserForm">  
  <property name="validator" ref="UserNameValidator" />
```



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Programmic (imperatively)

```
@RequestMapping(method = RequestMethod.POST)
public String processSubmit(@ModelAttribute Owner owner,
                           BindingResult result,
                           SessionStatus status) {
    new OwnerValidator().validate(owner, result);
    if (result.hasErrors()) {
        return "ownerForm";
    }
    else {
        this.clinic.storeOwner(owner);
        status.setComplete();
        return "redirect:owner.do?ownerId=" + owner.getId();
    }
}
```



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Aspect-Oriented (Constraint Validation)

```
@NotBlank
@Pattern(regex="^[a-zA-Z_-]*")
@Size(min=8, max=15)
@Constraint(validatedBy = UsernameValidator.class) //mixed!!!
private String userName;

public String getUsername() {
    return this.userName;
}

public void setUsername(String userName) {
    this.userName = userName;
}
```



Remediation Advice

- Use declarative model


```
<validator name="pwCharSet"  
  classname="org.myorg.PWCharSetValidator"  
  method="validatePWCharSet" msg="errors.pwChars"/>
```

```
<field property="password" depends="required, pwCharSet">  
  <arg0 key="typeForm.password.displayname"/>  
  <var> <var-name>Password</var-name>  
  <var-value>password</var-value> </var>  
</field>
```

- Encapsulate validators as 'plugins'
- Chain validator use with `depends=`




1.6 – Identify Controls Explicitly



2.3 – Identify Assets flow through the system

Assets exist not only in rest, but also flow through the system



Encapsulation: Struts, Spring

```
<s:form action='Cart'>
    <s:textfield name='quantity' label='Quantity' />
    <m:iterate_items collection="%=
org.myorg.Skeleton.StoreInventory.getStoreInventory(true) %>" />
```


```
Purse: <c:property name="purse.value" /><br>
<s:submit/></s:form>
```

```
<!-- By compound property -->
<bean id="person" class="org.myorg.app.Person">
    <property name="SocialSecurityNumber" value="555555555">
</bean>
```




3.2 – Identity Principal Resolution

Arrows indicate resolution of principal/assertion propagation



3.4 – Show Authorization in Structure

Coloration shows authorization by role



Authorization, Where it occurs

```
<authz:authorize ifAllGranted="ROLE_SUPERVISOR">
  <td>
    <A HREF="delete.jsp?id=<c:out value="\${contact.id}"/>">Delete</A>
  </td>
</authz:authorize>
```

```
<bean id="contactServiceMethodProtection"
class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aopalliance.MethodSecurityInterceptor">
  <property name="validateConfigAttributes">
    <value>true</value>
  </property>
  <property name="authenticationManager">
    <ref bean="providerManager"/>
  </property>
  <property name="accessDecisionManager">
    <ref local="methodAccessDecisionManager"/>
  </property>
  <property name="objectDefinitionSource">
    <value>

      com.myorg.service.ContactService.deleteContact=ROLE_SUPERVISOR
      ...
    </value>
  </property>
</bean>
```



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Authentication, Where it occurs

```
JSONRPCBridge json_bridge = (JSONRPCBridge) session.getAttribute  
("JSONRPCBridge");
```

```
json_bridge.registerObject("Authentication",  
SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication());
```

```
function retrieveCredential()  
{  
    try {  
        jsonrpc = new JSONRpcClient("/org/JSON-RPC");  
        // Call a Java method on the server  
        var result = jsonrpc.Authentication.getCredentials();  
        alert(result);  
    } catch(e) {  
        alert(e);  
    }  
}
```






Underlying Framework Analysis

Software, Software Everywhere

Dependencies on Underlying Framework

Software is built upon layers of other software



What Kind of Flaws are Found?

- Known vulnerabilities in open-source or product versions
- Weak security controls provided with the framework
- Framework features that must be disabled or configured to their secure form

Framework Security Controls

- The application environment provides controls.
What are the limitations?
 - Cryptography
 - Example: JCA
 - Authentication and Authorization
 - Example: JAAS
 - Sandboxing
 - JavaScript Same Origin Policy



Session Management

■ In Web.xml

- `<httpCookies httpOnlyCookies="true" ...>`

■ In code:

- ```
String sessionid = request.getSession().getId();
response.setHeader("SET-COOKIE", "JSESSIONID=" + sessionid
+ "; HttpOnly");
```





# JCA

- Check:
  - Cipher being used is appropriate for job
  - IV
    - 00000000?
    - Hard-coded?
  - Padding
  - Mode



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# ARA Is About Identifying Flaws

## FLAWS - Design

- Misuse of cryptography
- Duplicated data or code
- Lack of consistent input validation
- Missing authorization checks
- Insecure or lack of auditing
- Lack of authentication or session management on APIs
- Missing compartmentalization
- Assigning too much privilege or failing to give up privilege

# Remediation Advice


User `<%= ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML(user.getName()) %>!`

```
"
 onclick="<%= "openProfile("'+ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTMLAttribute(
 ESAPI.encoder().encodeForJavaScript(user.getId()) + "'" %>" />
```

- Use a context aware encoder, just as JXT:
  - <http://code.google.com/p/owasp-jxt/>
  - Uses `{user.getName() }` style syntax



# JavaScript Hijacking




- JavaScript Hijacking requires that the application return JSON objects
- The attacker loads the attack script into the JavaScript environment
- The attacking page uses a <SCRIPT> tag to make the cross page reference

# Remediation Advice

- Framework like Caja (<http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/> )
  - And \*careful\* application
- Scopes or removes:
  - eval,
  - Function, Function.constructor
  - with
- Freezes objects



# Ajax Interposition



## 1. Modify the XMLHttpRequest prototype

```
var xmlhttp=XMLHttpRequest;
XMLHttpRequest = function() {
 this.XHR = new xmlhttp();
 return this;
}
```

## 2. Wrap the send method

```
XMLHttpRequest.prototype.send =
 function (content) {
 //..add code to steal or alter
 content
 Sniff_and_Modify(content);
 // Pass call on
 return this.XHR.send(payload);
 }
```



# APIs Across Stateless Protocols

- Identifiers representing state can be abused
  - Prediction
  - Capture
  - Fixation
- State sent to the client between requests is altered or replayed
- Relevant Attack Patterns
  - Session hijacking/fixation
  - CSRF
  - Message Replay
  - Parameter manipulation




# Distributed Architecture

- Distributed systems are susceptible to network-based attacks


- Eavesdropping
- Tampering
- Spoofing
- Hijacking
- Observing

- Relevant Attack Patterns

- Interposition attacks
- Network sniffing
- Replay attacks



*Interposition Attack*



*Replay Attack*



# Dynamic Code Generation and Interpretation


- Languages and programming environments are moving more decisions from design-time to run-time
- Many attacks involve misinterpretation of data as code in these environments
- When and how will user input be used by runtime language interpreters?
- Relevant Attack Patterns
  - Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
  - SQL Injection
  - Buffer overflow
  - XML Injection
  - Shell command Injection
  - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

# Service-oriented Architecture (SOA)


- Security needed for SOA components
  - Web-services: SOAP/WSDL/UDDI
  - Message-oriented Middleware
  - Enterprise Service Bus
- Common Problems
  - Exposing backend code to dynamic attacks
  - Channel versus Message security
- Relevant Attack Patterns:
  - XML Injection / SQL Injection
  - Session Management Attacks
  - Direct File Manipulation



# ARA's find 'Flaw's



# Rich Internet Applications



- Processing moves to the client-side
- Relevant Attack Patterns
  - Direct API calls
  - CSRF
  - XSS
- Unique Attacks
  - JavaScript Hijacking
  - Ajax Interposition

# Pass tech.-specific KM by REFERENCE

- Do not duplicate technical resources in your T.M., that's a later step.
- Reference:
  - Code review guide:
    - [http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code\\_Review\\_Guide\\_Frontispiece](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Review_Guide_Frontispiece)
  - Testing guide:
    - [http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_Testing\\_Project](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Testing_Project)




# Critical Functionality Pointers

- Based on idiom/paradigm
- Control Patterns
  - Command Patterns
  - Inversion of Control containers
  - Session Management and other flow-drivers
- Underlying frameworks
  - Callbacks
  - Plugins
  - Frameworks
- Security features



# Exercise: Key Structural Elements of Java EE Apps



Thank you for your time.

